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HOW UNIVERSAL IS THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION?
Karin Mickelson*
All discourse on human rights is ... necessarily marked by the author’s position .... The 
first thing to do when confronted with such discourse is to situate it, to determine, as 
rigorously as possible, the place from which it is spoken: on this condition alone it can 
be understood, assimilated and, should circumstances require, demystified.1
Purporting to set forth “a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all 
nations” the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Universal 
Declaration o f  Human Rights in 1948, by a vote of 48-0, with 8 abstentions.2 In the 
fifty years since that time, international human rights law has grown and developed 
enormously.3 Nonetheless, the Universal Declaration itself continues to enjoy a unique 
status. Despite its lack of a formal legally binding quality at the time of its adoption,4 
many have argued that the Declaration has passed into the corpus of customary 
international law, and is thus binding upon all states.5 Even more important, however, 
is the Declaration's quasi-mystical significance. When one author refers to it as the 
“‘gospel’ of the human rights movement”6 he is only making explicit what many writers 
presuppose: that the Declaration is the normative foundation of international human
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rights. As such, it is the centerpiece of a discourse that has come to occupy a dominant 
position in current thinking. As one writer recently asserted:
The past few decades have witnessed the inexorable rise of the application of 
international human rights law as well as the extension of a wider public discourse on 
human rights, to the point where human rights could be seen as one of the most 
globalised political values of our times. The language of liberal human rights has 
moved in to fill the vacuum left by the demise of grand political narratives in the 
aftermath of the Cold War. Notwithstanding disputes over their conceptualisation and 
application, human rights are among the few utopian ideals left, and there is a 
remarkable degree of consensus by governments on the principle at least that certain 
rights be protected under international law.7
The fact that the Declaration was adopted without any negative votes is frequently cited 
as an important factor in its subsequent evolution, and the importance of the eight 
absentions is downplayed. Needless to say, the debates regarding the Declaration had 
not been without controversy; for example, Canada, although it voted in favour at the 
General Assembly, had abstained during the vote in the Third Committee.8 
Nevertheless, the unwillingness of any state to vote against the Declaration is regarded 
as significant, because of the assumption that, while the Declaration itself might be 
flawed from some perspectives, the norms embodied therein were not rejected outright 
by any member of the international community. John Humphrey, the Canadian head 
of the Human Rights Commission generally credited with producing the first draft of 
the Declaration, notes that the Socialist bloc offered a variety of justifications for 
abstention, many revolving around the basic concern that the rights enumerated in the 
Declaration could not be guaranteed under socio-economic conditions existing at the 
time.9 Saudi Arabia did not explain its abstention, but Humphrey points out that the 
Saudi representative in the Third Committee had expressed concern regarding the 
assertion in Article 18 that the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
includes the freedom to change one's religion, arguing that this was inconsistent with 
Islamic law.10 The only state that could be said to come close to rejection was South 
Africa, which abstained because of concerns about the potential legal significance of 
the Declaration.11 From the point of view of human rights advocates, this abstention 
could almost be regarded as providential: the pariah exception that proves the rule.
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In these discussions there appears to be only a hint of what would widely come to 
be regarded as a central controversy in international human rights law: the implications 
of differing cultural perceptions of human rights for the viability of international, let 
alone “universal”, standards. This has translated into an ongoing theoretical debate 
between advocates of the universality of international human rights norms and those 
who reject, or at least question, universality. The latter assert the lack of a transcultural 
consensus regarding either the values human rights are supposed to embody or the 
appropriateness of using the mechanism of “rights” as a means of protecting such 
values. This debate strikes at the heart of international human rights law, the origins of 
which are generally traced to a widespread desire to respond to Nazi atrocities, and to 
put in place a set of international standards to safeguard human dignity.12
This theoretical debate has obvious political and practical implications. Perhaps 
most notably, it is reflected in recent calls for a “review” of the Universal Declaration. 
In 1997, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia raised the hackles of the 
international human rights community by suggesting that as part of the upcoming 
commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration, a review of 
the Declaration be undertaken.13 He pointed out that at the time of the adoption of the 
Declaration, the United Nations had 56 member states. In the intervening decades, the 
membership of the organization has more than tripled, with the diversity of views 
represented undergoing a similar expansion. The Declaration should therefore be 
revisited to reflect this change and to make it truly representative of the views of the 
international community as a whole. Similarly, there have been proposals for the 
proclamation of a “Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities”, intended to
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complement the existing Declaration by setting forth “the responsibilities that go along 
with human rights.”14
This article seeks to present a context within which to evaluate these challenges to 
the universality of the Universal Declaration. It begins with a consideration of the 
general bases for challenges to universality, proceeds to examine four representative 
positions taken within the scholarly debate concerning the universality of human 
rights,15 and analyzes the controversy surrounding the debate and its political subtext. 
Alternative views that attempt to move beyond the impasse of the debate are then 
explored. The article concludes with a consideration of the implications for the 
Universal Declaration. It is argued that challenges to the Declaration must be 
understood and evaluated within a broader philosophical, political and historic context, 
and that the tendency to dismiss them out of hand is a misguided and counteiproductive 
attempt to exclude dialogue and debate about human rights at the present time.
Challenges to universality: The context of the debate
Universality as an ideal in the international system has been challenged from a number 
of different perspectives: what does such universality mean in a world characterized by 
philosophical skepticism and a plurality of cultures and states?
In the first place, there are philosophical challenges to the universality of human 
rights. The philosophical foundations of international human rights were the subject 
of considerable controversy even during the process leading up to the Universal 
Declaration: Delegations at the Human Rights Commission debated whether human 
rights should be grounded in a reference to transcendent “nature”, or to “God”.16 A 
deliberate choice was made to avoid the controversy these references would trigger; 
instead, human rights were grounded in the seemingly uncontroversial notion of human 
dignity. The Preamble to the Universal Declaration refers to the “dignity and worth of 
the human person”; Article 1 proclaims, “All human beings are bom free and equal in 
dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act 
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” The status of human dignity as the 
source of human rights is made explicit in the International Covenants, both of which 
state that human rights “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.”17
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Characterizing human rights in terms of human dignity, while providing a 
conceptual foundation for this area, simply postponed the definitional dilemma to a later 
stage o f inquiry. The question then becomes -  what is “human dignity”? Can it be 
defined in a way that avoids essentialist assumptions about human beings, human 
nature, and human aspirations? While some scholars have attempted such a definition,18 
others have come to regard the enterprise as futile. Noting the growing disinclination 
“to take ‘theories of human nature’ seriously”,19 for example, Richard Rorty implies that 
the search for foundations of human rights in an understanding of human nature that 
transcends culture, time and place is a misguided endeavour. Rorty does not think that 
this renders human rights themselves meaningless; instead, he feels that their 
justification must lie in the passionate conviction of human rights activists rather than 
any overarching and unassailable theoretical foundation.20 However, such a conclusion 
leaves certain important questions unanswered, most notably the question of how a 
human rights advocate confronts an opponent who is equally committed to her own 
opposing point of view. Such an approach has also been criticized for leaving human 
rights with very flimsy support. As one writer puts it, “Rights without a metanarrative 
is like a car without seat-belts; on hitting the first moral bump with ontological 
implications, the passengers' safety is jeopardised.”21
Another challenge to the notion of an uncontroversial understanding of human 
dignity has come from those who emphasize the impact of culture. The concern 
expressed is that there is no transcultural understanding of “human dignity”; in other 
words, that there is no “universal” understanding of what human dignity means outside 
of particular cultural and social contexts. In particular, commentators have expressed 
reservations about the tendency to “universalize” the highly individualistic orientation 
of modem, Western societies. As Jack Donnelly notes, “The very idea of human rights 
does entail a certain individualism. Each person, simply as an individual human being, 
is specially entitled to the treatment demanded by human rights.”22 In part as a response 
to the perceived failures of the system of minority rights protection under the League 
of Nations system, the post-World War II preference was for safeguarding even 
cultural, religious and linguistic rights as pertaining to individual members of groups
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rather than the groups themselves.23 In contrast, it is often argued that many if not most 
cultures balance the interests of the individual and society in the opposite way, placing 
greater importance on communitarian or societal values.24
The discipline of anthropology has been associated with emphasizing the dangers 
involved in assuming that notions of morality and ethics transcend culture, and in 
projecting the individualism characteristic of modem Western society onto other 
cultures. In the process leading up to the adoption of the Universal Declaration itself, 
for example, the American Anthropological Association submitted a “Statement on 
Human Rights” to the United Nations Human Rights Commission.25 The statement 
represents an attempt to address the question, “How can the proposed Declaration be 
applicable to all human beings, and not be a statement of rights conceived only in terms 
of the values prevalent in the countries of Western Europe and America?”26 The 
Statement wastes no time in identifying the crux of the matter:
The problem is thus to formulate a statement of human rights that will do more than just 
phrase respect for the individual as an individual. It must also take into full account the 
individual as a member of the social group of which he is a part, whose sanctioned 
modes of life shape his behavior, and with whose fate his own is thus inextricably 
linked.27
In order for the proposed Declaration to avoid replicating these mistakes, the 
Statement proposes that it include three basic principles:
1) The individual realizes his personality through his culture, 
hence respect for individual differences entails a respect for 
cultural differences.28
2) Respect for differences between cultures is validated by the 
scientific fact that no technique of qualitatively evaluating 
cultures has been discovered.29
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3) Standards and values are relative to the culture from which 
they derive so that any attempt to formulate postulates that 
grow out of the beliefs or moral codes of one culture must to 
that extent detract from the applicability of any Declaration of 
Human Rights to mankind as a whole.30
The Statement is a fascinating text. It is a scathing indictment of Western 
arrogance vis-à-vis non-Western cultures and, at the same time, an impassioned plea 
for tolerance o f cultural diversity. While it has come under attack from a variety of 
sources,31 it remains one of the clearest articulations of a pure “cultural relativist” 
stance vis-à-vis human rights.32 The Statement does not reject the notion of a 
Declaration altogether, and even appears to regard the task of drafting such a document 
as a worthy, albeit difficult, endeavour. Its primary concern is that the Declaration be 
what it purports to be instead of a Western manifesto masquerading as a document of 
universal applicability: “The rights of Man in the Twentieth Century cannot be 
circumscribed by the standards of any single culture, or be dictated by the aspirations 
of any single people.”33 To the extent that the Declaration fails to “embrace and 
recognize the validity of many different ways of life”, it fails to be a statement of 
human rights, and will instead “lead to frustration, not realization o f the personalities 
of vast numbers of human beings.”34
Finally, the philosophical and cultural dimensions of arguments against 
universality must also be placed in the context of the existing international system, with 
its division into sovereign states. The classic argument regarding state sovereignty 
posits that human rights within states are beyond the realm of international scrutiny. 
In part because of the prevalence of this type of argument during the early years of the 
international human rights system, state sovereignty has come to play an important role 
in human rights discourse — it is blamed for a multitude of evils. In fact, sovereignty 
is sometimes portrayed as the antithesis of human rights. The latter is said to represent 
a set of internationally recognized standards, while the former is the last refuge of the 
scoundrel government. In fact, the extreme form of state sovereignty argument is 
rarely, if ever, invoked in current debates. Instead, concerns tend to be expressed about
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“politicization” of human rights and “conditionality” in relation to trade or 
development assistance. Moreover, there is considerable overlap between political 
concerns and concerns regarding culture, as will be explored below.
Universality vs. particularity: Positions within the human rights debate
Against that preliminary backdrop, the various approaches to the issue of the 
universality of human rights norms can be separated into four broad categories:
1) The concept of human rights is of Western origin, and cannot be simply 
transplanted outside of that unique cultural and philosophical context. Each 
culture has its own concept of human dignity and how it should best be 
protected; while there may be similarities between the various approaches, 
they cannot be reduced to a common foundation.
A 1980 piece by Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, “Human Rights: A Western 
Construct with Limited Applicability”,35 is often cited as an articulation of this position. 
The authors espouse the view that conceptions of human dignity and social justice are 
defined within, and strongly influenced by, specific historical, cultural and ideological 
contexts. As Pollis has stated elsewhere, “Human rights, both in their philosophic 
and/or theoretical formulation and their practice, are rooted in the specifics of particular 
societies and civilizations.”36 Pollis and Schwab argue that “in most states in the world, 
human rights as defined by the West are rejected or, more accurately, are 
meaningless.”37 These authors have played an extremely important role in the 
universality debate; one might almost say that if Pollis and Schwab had not existed, the 
proponents of universality would have had to invent them. Unfortunately, the title of 
their article has come to have a great deal more visibility than their actual arguments, 
most of which have tended to be glossed over, and the most problematic of which have 
been subjected to merciless critique.
Pollis and Schwab begin by grounding their analysis in an attempt to account for 
the controversy surrounding the concept of human rights:
It is becoming increasingly evident that the Western political philosophy upon which 
the Charter and the Declaration are based provide only one particular interpretation of 
human rights, and that this Western notion may not be successfully applicable to non- 
Westem areas for several reasons: ideological differences whereby economic rights are 
given priority over individual civil and political rights and cultural differences whereby
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the philosophic underpinnings defining human nature and the relationship of individuals 
to others and to society are markedly at variance with Western individualism.38
They proceed to trace the roots of human rights theory to a particular historical 
period (seventeenth to twentieth centuries) and a particular geographical location 
(England, France and the United States).39 They emphasize that the philosophical 
foundation of human rights, the notion of the “autonomous individual and his inherent 
rights”, was seen not only as explaining but as justifying the new social order emerging 
at that time, going on to become “part of the prevailing shared values of Western 
societies.”40 Pollis and Schwab emphasize Western dominance of the international 
community when the United Nations was established, and point out that the Universal 
Declaration “was adopted at a time when most Third World countries were still under 
colonial rule.”41 Given this, they bluntly assert that “to argue that human rights has a 
standing which is universal in character is to contradict historical reality.”42 In 
particular, with respect to the Universal Declaration, they note:
[I]n essence the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a document whose 
underlying values are democratic and libertarian, based on the notion of atomized 
individuals possessed of certain inalienable rights in nature. ... The Declaration is 
predicated on the assumption that Western values are paramount and ought to be 
extended to the non-Westem world.43
Most states, in contrast, “do not have a cultural heritage of individualism, and the 
doctrines of inalienable human rights have been neither disseminated nor 
assimilated.”44 Instead, the focus in most societies is on communitarian values. 
Moreover, in societies engaged in a process of modernization, the state itself takes on 
a central role: “the state -  as a substitute for the traditional communal group -  has 
become the embodiment of the people, and the individual has no rights or freedoms 
that are natural and outside the purview of the state.”45 Thus:
The cultural patterns, ideological underpinnings, and developmental goals of non- 
Westem and socialist states are markedly at variance with the prescriptions of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Efforts to impose the Declaration as it
,s/bid. at 1.
19Ibid at 2.
40/bid. at 3.
A'/bid. at 4.
AZIbid. at 4.
" Ib id  at 8.
44Ibid. at 13.
4SIbid. Not surprisingly, this is regarded as one of the most controversial elements of Pollis & Schwab's 
analysis.
currently stands not only reflect a moral chauvinism and ethnocentric bias but are also 
bound to fail.46
Pollis and Schwab assert the need for a rethinking o f human rights, based on a 
recognition of the particular historical circumstances in which the Western 
understanding o f human rights evolved.47 They argue:
[R]ather than focusing on additional legal mechanisms for imposing the West's 
philosophic doctrines of individual and inalienable human rights on the non-Western 
world, discussion of the issue of human rights should begin with the differing historical 
and contemporary circumstances of non-Westem societies.48
These authors indicate that all societies have notions of human dignity and even 
human rights,49 and it is clear that they do not reject the possibility of universality.50 
However, the focus of their argument is on destabilizing the presumption that such 
universality already exists, and that it conveniently overlaps with standard Western 
views of human rights. Instead, they argue, “If the notion of human rights is to be a 
viable universal concept it will be necessary to analyze the differing cultural and 
ideological conceptions of human rights and the impact o f one on the other.”51 The 
problem with standard approaches to human rights is not only that they reflect a 
Western bias, but that “there has been a tendency to view human rights ahistorically 
and in isolation from their social, political and economic milieu.”52 Thus, according 
to Pollis and Schwab:
What is being advocated here is a rethinking of the conception of human rights that both 
takes into account the diversity in substance that exists and recognizes the need for 
extensive analysis of the relationship of human rights to the broader social context. 
Through this process it may become feasible to formulate human rights doctrines that 
are more validly universal that those currently propagated.53
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2) The concept of human rights is of Western origin, but is of universal 
applicability. It developed out of the unique set of historical and political 
circumstances, but constitutes an appropriate and essential set of safeguards 
for the individual living in a modern industrial society.
Two well-known proponents of this view are Jack Donnelly and Rhoda Howard. Both 
argue that the development of the concept of human rights — that is, rights based 
exclusively on one's existence as a human being — is closely linked with the tradition 
of Western liberalism. They assert that “[t]he standard list of human rights in the 
Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights can be easily derived from the liberal 
conception of the individual and the state”54 and that “the near-perfect fit between 
liberalism and the Universal Declaration reflects a deep and essential theoretical 
connection.”55
They recognize the importance of notions of human dignity in international human 
rights instruments, but insist tjiat human dignity and human rights are quite distinct.56 
Intriguingly, they seem to place human dignity and human rights on opposite sides of 
the universality/particularity continuum:
Conceptions of human dignity, in their social and political aspects, express particular 
understandings of the inner (moral) nature and worth of the human person and his or her 
proper (political) relations with society. By contrast, human rights are the equal and 
inalienable rights (in the strong sense of entitlements that ground particularly powerful 
claims against the state) that each person has simply as a human being.57
Donnelly and Howard acknowledge that human rights “are a particular social practice 
that aims to realize a distinctive substantive conception of human dignity.”58 
However, that particular social practice is one of universal applicability. In contrast,
Conceptions of human dignity vary dramatically across societies, and most of these 
variations are incompatible with the values of equality and autonomy that underlie 
human rights. Most regimes, and their underlying social conceptions of human dignity, 
necessarily deny both the idea and the practice of human rights.59
Donnelly and Howard then go even further, arguing that a liberal regime is the only 
type of political regime that is consistent with human rights: “Other types of regimes, 
and the conceptions of human dignity on which they rest, may be defensible on other
54R.E. Howard and J. Donnelly, “Human Dignity, Human Rights and Political Regimes”, in Donnelly, supra 
note 22, 66 at 71.
55Ibid.
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moral or political grounds, but they will not stand up to scrutiny under the standard of 
human rights.”60
Donnelly is not unaware of the probability of attack from those who regard this 
view as Eurocentric. Perhaps that is part o f the reason for his insistence on 
characterizing human rights as “a quintessentially modem phenomenon, a response to 
the creation of capitalist market economies and modem nation states”,61 and thus 
lacking in traditional society, whether Western or non-Westem. Donnelly argues that 
prior to modernization, “the problems that human rights seek to address, the particular 
violations of human dignity that they seek to prevent, either did not exist or were not 
widely perceived to be central social problems.”62 To the extent that he considers the 
ways in which an embrace of human rights can lead to an erosion or shift in traditional 
values, he seems to regard such a process as inevitable, almost evolutionary:
Westernization, modernization, development, and underdevelopment -  for better or 
worse, the dominant contemporary social and economic forces -  have in most places 
significantly separated the individual from the small, supportive traditional community. 
Economic, social and cultural changes in and disruptions of traditional communities 
have often removed the support and protection that would “justify” or “compensate for” 
the absence of individual human rights .... Society, which once protects a person's 
dignity and provided a place in the world, now appears, in the form of the modem state, 
the modem economy, and the modem city, as an oppressive, alien power that assaults 
people's dignity and that of their families. ... In such circumstances, human rights 
appear to be a “natural” response to changing conditions, a logical and necessary 
evolution of the means to realize human dignity.63
Donnelly goes so far as to draw an analogy between the problems associated with 
modernity to the seatbelt: “Seatbelts — human rights -  first emerged in the West because 
that is where the cars first were. But once cars began to run amok on the streets in 
other parts of the world, they brought with them the need for seatbelts and all the 
rest.”64 The analogy with seatbelts is telling: after all, who could object to a seatbelt, 
unless one were simply obstinately resistant to accepting protections for one's own 
personal safety? The argument is presented in a straightforward manner, without 
triumphalism. The process of modernization is upon us all; we might as well seek out 
the standards that will make it tolerable. Donnelly even raises the possibility that 
modem states and markets “may not be a good thing”, such that “the West can perhaps
MIbid.
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be blamed, rather than praised, for inventing (or, rather, having been forced to invent) 
human rights.”65
Notions of human dignity are somehow presented as static, unable to adapt to or 
to adequately address modem conditions of alienation. Perhaps even more 
importantly, according to Donnelly, “Alternative conceptions of human dignity amount 
to challenges to the idea of human rights.”66 Donnelly argues that the attempt to equate 
notions of human dignity with human rights could have negative impacts both in 
countries with “established human rights practices”, (read: the West) and in other parts 
of the world (read: the Rest).67 In the latter, “it would become easier for a repressive 
regime to cloak itself in the mantle of human rights while actually violating them, 
thereby turning ‘human rights’ into an instrument of oppression rather than 
liberation.”68 In the former, “the conceptual bases of human rights are likely to be 
eroded, thereby weakening the practice.”69
3) The concept of human rights is universal; each cultural tradition has
analogous concepts, although the actual language of “rights” may not be used.
A great deal of energy has been devoted to attempts to find analogies to ideas of human 
rights in various cultural and religious traditions. Many of the scholars who take this 
position focus not so much on the concept of rights themselves, but on the notion of 
human dignity which those rights are intended to protect and promote. The 
universality of notions of human dignity, according to this view, is sufficient to 
establish a transcultural foundation for human rights.
Paulin J. Hountondji, a Beninese philosopher, has noted that the “source” of human 
rights must be located not in some abstract theory but in the reality of human suffering, 
and in the struggle against it.70 He asserts that, “Only by remaining silent about this 
commonly experienced fact, or by considerably reducing its implications, is it possible 
to make human rights an invention of Western culture.”71 Hountondji is preoccupied 
with the irony of finding agreement between “certain local potentates trying, in the 
name of their peoples’ independence and cultural originality, to relativize the idea of 
‘human rights’ ” and “the most insipid ideologists of Western superiority.”72 He
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recognizes the undeniable historical linkage between modem doctrines of human rights 
and the West, but refuses to characterize it as exclusive. According to Hountondji, 
“Europe certainly did not invent human rights, any more than it invented human 
dignity.”73 Instead, the European innovation lies in taking the universal idea of human 
dignity and elaborating a “philosophy of human rights”.74 Values in general, and 
notions of human dignity and human rights in particular, cannot be accurately situated 
in one time and place. For that very reason, Hountondji insists, “it is impossible to 
apply total cultural relativism to values, to make them depend, not only for their 
artificial expression and determination but also for their ultimate basis, on fortuitous 
cultural factors.”75 He goes on to assert:
For the only foundation here are human beings: human beings who for millenia have 
suffered at the hands of human beings, in all countries, and throughout all cultures; 
human beings so often duped to the point of becoming the accomplices of their torturers 
and of the social systems that oppress them, but also human beings who can sometimes 
rebel or become indignant, expressing, by this act alone, their awareness of an 
irrepressible dignity. What varies, not only from one culture to another, as has already 
been stated, but also within one culture from one period to another and from one class 
or social group to another, are the forms of this indignation, the modes of expression of 
this universal demand for respect and, consequently, the details of the rights considered 
to be essential and inalienable. But in no society is awareness of dignity truly absent, 
perhaps because in no society, alas, has this dignity ever been fully respected.76
Hountondji considers and rejects the standard justification, raised by Pollis and 
Schwab, that states must sometimes repress rights in the short term in order to achieve 
development in the long term. He argues that even if development according to the 
Western model did require such sacrifices, there is no reason why the Third World in 
general, or Africa in particular, should follow the same model. He asserts, in fact, that 
if such repression was in fact required, that should be grounds for rejecting that path:
Who has decided that from now on, human history must reproduce everywhere the 
choices or, at best, the alternatives of European histoiy, that these alternatives were the 
only ones imaginable and practicable, that the horizon of what was possible was 
henceforth limited, for all time, by the actual experience of today's industrialized 
countries? On the basis of a critique of known experience, putting to good use all 
available resources of knowledge and intelligence, why not seek new roads to 
‘development’, forms of progress that respect both the legitimate demands of 
sovereignty and economic well-being, and the imprescriptible dignity of human 
beings?77
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Hountondji goes on to ask why, instead of focusing on European history and models, 
more attention is not paid to the political history of pre-colonial Africa.78 He does not 
take a romantic or idealized view of that past; instead, he ends his paper with a 
consideration of just how one might undertake the project of examining the status of 
human rights in “so-called traditional Africa”. He emphasizes that the expectations of 
such a study must be made clear. First, he insists that the study should not be seen as 
determining “the validity or non-validity of human rights here and now, in Africa 
today”.79 Next, he argues that to search for African ideas of human rights must avoid 
the trap of “simply looking for indigenous counterparts, in our own cultures, of the 
cultural products which seem to us most remarkable in contemporary Western 
civilization, to wit, a ‘philosophy’ of human rights”.80 He states:
Any anthropological project whose only purpose is to react to the provocations of 
Western chauvinism, and whose only ambition is to establish the comparability of our 
cultures with those of Europe -  thereby continuing surreptitiously to transmit the very 
models it claims to challenge — is unacceptable because it is contradictory. It is for 
themselves and not for Europe, in themselves and not to refute Europe's views and 
blunders concerning them, that our cultures must be studied: to understand their logic 
and way of functioning, their internal contradictions, their evolution, their prospects, 
their grandeur and their limitations, in order better to appreciate and transform them.81
What Hountondji proposes is a rejection of the colonialist view of the static nature 
of “traditional African society”. He sees the need for “a critical history of repressive 
elements in our own culture, a history of the way in which this repression has been 
exercised, disapproved of, opposed, imposed, aggravated — in short, a critical history 
or the contradictions and struggles within our apparently immobile culture.”82
4) The concept of human rights may not be universal, but there is sufficient 
cross-cultural commonality to be able to identify a core set of values that 
ought to be recognized and protected through human rights guarantees.
Proponents of this view often speak of a concept of universality which encompasses 
only certain basic norms or principles. S.P. Sinha presents an argument in favor of a 
version of “limited universality” in a 1978 article entitled “Human rights 
philosophically”.83 Taking issue with approaches to human rights which do not take 
into account the extent of differences between cultures, Sinha draws a distinction
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between the “concept” of human rights and the “catalogue” o f human rights. He 
argues that while the concept of human rights is universal, the catalogue of rights 
within any society is culture-based. According to Sinha, such a distinction permits a 
middle-ground between the extreme universalist and relativist positions.
Sinha delineates two “patterns” of human rights, the first involving “one 
comprehensive legal document of one particular society which is characterized by one 
predominant cultural [sic] and one predominant ideology”, the second involving setting 
out particular rights in a “treaty about which there has been a common agreement 
among the states party to the treaty”.84 He portrays the modem human rights 
movement as having adopted the former approach, which he sees reflected in the 
Universal Declaration:
[The Universal Declaration] enumerates rights, intended to apply to the whole world, 
which have no claim to universality. It contains rights which are culturally, 
ideologically, and politically non-universal .... Thus, to the extent these kinds of rights 
are concerned, we have the scenario of one particular culture, or one particular ideology, 
or one particular political system claiming to be imposed upon the entire world.85
Sinha argues that at least part of the responsibility for the “frustration of human 
rights throughout the world” lies with the weaknesses of this single catalogue 
approach.86 The primary weakness “lies in not distinguishing the concept of human 
rights from any particular catalogue of such rights.”87 The notion that the individual 
should be treated justly, and be both protected “from privation by the powerful” and 
given a means of fulfilling his or her needs, according to Sinha, is “undoubtedly an 
ideal accepted in all societies.”88 However, “[s]ince the world is pluralistic, composed 
of societies which are culturally, ideologically, and economically different, there can 
be no single, specific way of going about achieving that ideal.”89 Sinha emphasizes 
differences in history, culture, ideology and economics among human beings, and 
insists that human rights theory must recognize these differences.90
On the other hand, Sinha rejects the view that the international movement for 
human rights is forestalled by the existence of cultural differences. He insists:
[W]hat is culturally variable is not the concept that the human being be protected from 
the excesses of the State organs and that just conditions be created for the fulfillment of
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his needs, but, instead, the catalogue or the specification as to how this is to be achieved 
in different cultures.91
However, the mandate of the human rights movement must be rethought:
Since different social systems, characterized by their own economic, cultural, and 
ideological particularity, have different ways of going about achieving the fulfillment 
of needs of those who compose their membership, the task of [the] human rights 
movement becomes the ensuring of justice in fulfillment of man's needs within the 
context of these different systems of economic, cultural and ideological particularities.92
Such an approach would “make it possible to develop particular catalogues of specific 
human rights for different social systems.”93 Sinha does not deny that the catalogues 
might have considerable commonalities and overlap; parts of them might even be 
universal. However, he insists that it would be universality of a very different kind:
[This universality] would be a consequence of applying the human rights imperative to 
the different social systems and not an instance of the catalogue of one particular society 
being rammed down the throat of another under the crusadic disguise of human rights.
It is self-defeating for the human-rights movement to take the latter approach... and then 
-  and here is the greatest danger of all -  retire in the smug delusion that having done 
that, justice has thereby been achieved for the individual.94
Similarly, Alison Dundes Renteln has argued that we need to go beyond a 
“presumption” of universality in order to explore cross-cultural commonalities that will 
enable us to formulate a truly international understanding of human rights.95 As an 
alternative, she proposes that the focus must be on the identification of those 
fundamental norms on which there can be true cross-cultural consensus:
In the end we must resist the temptation of believing that all people share a single moral 
conception. This is contrary to reality. But at the same time we need not abandon the 
search for universals. Diversity does not preclude the possibility that there may be 
convergence in the many moral systems of the world. The question which remains to 
be answered is what particular moral standards all societies hold in common. The 
presumption of universality, a common Western intuition, must be shed. The way will 
then be clear to discover cross-cultural universals. There remains hope that the ideals
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of all cultures contain some commonalities. Greater specificity is needed if we are to 
rescue human rights from their precarious position. It is my hope that by taking the 
approach set forth in this study we will come to know what moral principles are shared 
across the globe, and thereby what international human rights are possible.96
Dundes Renteln seeks to rescue relativism from the confusion created by both its 
proponents and its critics. The tendency has been to view the relativist position as 
dictating tolerance as a value; however, Dundes Renteln argues that “the theory of 
ethical relativism as descriptive hypothesis is not a value theory but rather a theory 
about value judgments.”91 Thus, she emphasizes the need to confront the reality of 
cultural diversity, rather than advocating that diversity be embraced as a value in itself. 
The importance of relativism, according to her, is that it emphasizes the extent to which 
value judgments are inescapably ethnocentric. Nevertheless, the existence of 
differences among cultures and peoples does not mean that there is no convergence. 
She asserts, “The crucial point to understand is that just because there are discrete, 
separate, and competing moral systems does not necessarily mean that they do not 
overlap. The extent of their congruence remains to be seen.”98
Universality vs. particularity: the politics
The differences between these various positions may appear to be based more on 
semantics than substance. What is important to bear in mind, however, is the intensely 
political subtext of many of these discussions. Largely for that reason, the 
universality/particularity debate is frequently characterized by vitriolic exchanges 
between proponents of the various positions.
Accusations of racism, ethnocentrism, and opportunism are frequently used in 
order to trivialize the concerns of advocates of cultural relativism or particularity. For 
example, in an article entitled “Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for
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Community”,99 Rhoda Howard expresses the view that cultural “relativism” is really 
cultural “absolutism”, which she defines as follows:
Cultural absolutism is a philosophical position that declares a society's culture to be of 
supreme ethical value. It advocates ethnocentric adherence to one’s own cultural norms 
as an ethically correct attitude for everyone except loosely-defined “Westerners.” It 
thus posits particularist cultures as of more ethical value that any universal principle of 
justice. In the left-right/North-South debate that permeates today’s ideological 
exchanges, cultural absolutists specifically argue that culture is of more value than the 
internationally-accepted (but Western in origin) principle of human rights.100
Howard concludes that “[cjultural absolutism is the antithesis of human rights.”101 
Similarly, Fernando Teson condemns in scathing terms the view, which he sees as 
implicit in a relativist position, that only certain countries or cultures should benefit 
from human rights; he argues that “the theory is fundamentally immoral and replete 
with racist overtones.”102 While acknowledging the impulse to respect cultural 
autonomy, he is generally dismissive of “well-intentioned proposals that are deferential 
to tyrannical governments and/ insufficiently concerned with human suffering”.103
While the so-called “relativist” approaches tend to reflect a much more nuanced 
critique of universality, their proponents often question the purity of motive of those 
who seek to impose a particular set of values on the international community. They 
invoke history to support their arguments. More than one scholar has put forward 
pointed reminders that presumptions of universality have been used in the past as 
dubious justifications for outside intervention. In relation to Latin America, for 
example, Francisco Miro Quesada has noted:
The process through which imperialist capital intervened in the internal politics of Latin 
American nations was generally based on the “ideology of the civilizing role”. This 
ideology was characteristic of Western domination over our countries. The West 
viewed itself as the source of civilization and spiritual forces. It had a historic mission: 
to civilize the rest of humanity. Nations would be civilized only if this mission was 
accomplished.104
He goes on to argue that “the West used a liberal and democratic ideology, proclaiming 
respect for human rights, in order to justify economic penetration.”105 Similarly, the
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American Anthropological Association's 1948 “Statement on Human Rights” 
emphasizes that part o f the importance in affirming the positive value o f cultural 
difference lies in rejecting the West’s historical tendency to treat cultural differences 
as a sign of inferiority, and thus disregard and obliterate them:
In the history of Western Europe and America ... economic expansion, control of 
armaments, and an evangelical religious tradition have translated the recognition of 
cultural differences into a summons to action. This has been emphasized by 
philosophical systems that have stressed absolutes in the realm of values and ends. 
Definitions of freedom, concepts of the nature of human rights, and the like, have thus 
been narrowly drawn. Alternatives have been decried, and suppressed where controls 
have been established over non-European people.106
The Statement goes on to detail the “disastrous” consequences of this point of view, 
an expansion of the West “marked by demoralization of human personality and the 
disintegration of human rights among the peoples over whom hegemony has been
established.”107
Perhaps the most important reason for the hostility towards relativists’ positions 
is that their arguments can so easily be invoked by states more concerned with 
justification of their poor human rights records than with cultural authenticity. Thus, 
for example, Donnelly focuses on the potential for abuse of the relativist position, 
invoking the spectre of self-interested application of the doctrine:
[W]hile recognizing the legitimate claims of self-determination and cultural relativism, 
we must be alert to cynical manipulations of a dying, lost, or even mythical cultural 
past. We must not be misled by complaints of the inappropriateness of “Western” 
human rights made by repressive regimes whose practices have at best only the most 
tenuous connection to the indigenous culture; communitarian rhetoric too often cloaks 
the depredations of corrupt and often Westernized or deracinated elites.108
This concern, in fact, extends beyond the hard-core universalists. Even Adamantia 
Pollis, almost invariably cited as a proponent of the relativist position, has recently 
argued that invocations of cultural differences should be carefully scrutinized.109 
Others have been more blunt, characterizing invocations of cultural difference as an 
updated version of attempts to block external scrutiny of internal practices on the basis 
of state sovereignty.110
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What seems to be overlooked is that many of the so-called relativists do not 
entirely preclude the possibility of critique in general, or external critique in particular. 
Pollis and Schwab, for example, note that
What ought to be admitted by those who argue universality is that human rights as a 
Western concept based on natural right should become the standard upon all nations 
ought to agree, recognizing, however, that this is only one particular value system.111
Similarly, Dundes Renteln emphasizes that the inescapably ethnocentric nature of our 
ethical judgments does not preclude criticism of other cultures.
There is no reason why the relativist should be paralyzed, as critics have often asserted.
But a relativist will acknowledge that the criticism is based on his own ethnocentric 
standards and realizes also that the condemnation may be a form of cultural imperialism. 
Under extreme circumstances, meaning that an action in another culture violates one of 
the relativist’s most deeply held beliefs, the relativist may decide that criticism and even 
intervention are lesser evils than either ethnocentrism or cultural imperialism. Certainly 
the moral criticism loses some of its force if it no longer stems from universal standards. 
Nevertheless, the relativist is not prevented from offering criticism, and the force of his 
argument against a practice may not be uninfluential. In an interdependent world, if 
culture A objects strenuously enough to a practice in culture B, culture B may fear a loss 
of foreign aid or other privileges. Thus, it is not obvious that acknowledging that a 
criticism is ethnocentric renders it impotent. It is better to be honest about the local 
source o f the criticism that to pretend that it is universal.112
Even the American Anthropological Association's “Statement on Human Rights” does 
not contemplate a complete lack of vantage point from which to critique oppressive 
practices. Indeed, it asserts that “underlying” cultural values can be drawn upon to 
combat oppressive or imperialistic tendencies of governments.113
Proponents of the universalist position do not seem interested in these kinds of 
niceties. Universality, whether well-founded or not, provides a particularly 
comfortable vantage point from which to critique.114 This may be why many view with 
alarm the trend on the part of traditionally recalcitrant states to stop rejecting human 
rights altogether. One writer has suggested that “interpretation of human rights norms 
may have replaced rejection by Asian states.”115 In other words, rather than denying 
the possibility of universality, these states may be shifting towards demanding a voice 
in defining it.
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Arguably, such a shift was apparent in the process leading up to the Second World 
Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna, Austria, from 8-12 June 1993. At the 
Asian Regional Preparatory Committee meeting, held in Bangkok, the governments of 
a number of states advocated an approach to human rights protection that would be 
sensitive to cultural particularities and differences. The Bangkok Declaration, said to 
contain “the aspirations and commitments of the Asian region”, reflected these 
concerns. The Preamble included a recognition that “the promotion of human rights 
should be encouraged by cooperation and consensus, and not through confrontation 
and imposition of incompatible values”. Paragraphs 7 and 8 provide that the Asian 
states:
Stress the universality, objectivity and non-selectivity of all human rights and the need 
to avoid the application of double standards in the implementation of human rights and 
politicization, and that no violation of human rights can be justified;
Recognize that while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in 
the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in 
mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, 
cultural and religious backgrounds."6
The Declaration also expressed concern about the trend towards the “politicization” of 
human rights and the practice of tying aid to human rights concerns; Paragraph 4 
provides that the Asian States “[d]iscourage any attempt to use human rights as a 
conditionality for extending development assistance.”117
Despite the ambiguity of the Bangkok Declaration, it has been interpreted as 
expressing continuing opposition to human rights.118 Partly because of the results of 
the Bangkok meeting, many observers feared that the outcome of the World 
Conference would represent a retreat from the notions of universality of international 
human rights norms.119 The position of a number of governments and almost all the
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non-governmental organizations involved in the Conference process was that such a 
retreat was to be avoided at all costs. In the end, the Vienna Declaration and 
accompanying programme of action did include references to these basic principles:
The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms the solemn commitment of all States 
to fulfill their obligations to promote universal respect for, and observance and 
protection of, all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, other instruments relating to human rights, and 
international law. The universal nature o f these rights and freedoms is beyond 
question...
Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings; their 
protection and promotion is the first responsibility of Governments.
All human rights are universal, indivisible, and interdependent and interrelated. The 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, 
on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national 
and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds 
must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and 
cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.120
However, the Vienna Declaration did not eliminate the pre-existing uncertainty 
regarding universality. According to one Asian commentator,
The West went to Vienna accusing Asia of trying to undermine the ideal of universality, 
and determined to blame Asia if the conference failed. The result after weeks of 
wrangling was a predictable diplomatic compromise ambiguous enough so all could live 
with it, but that settled very few things. There was no real dialogue between Asia and 
the West, no genuine attempt to address the issues or forge a meeting of the minds. If 
anything, the Vienna conference may only have hardened the deep skepticism with 
which many Asian countries regard Western posturing on human rights.121
Universality and particularity: beyond the impasse?
Finger-pointing on all sides has rendered the debate in this area somewhat sterile; it 
seems that there is only so far one can go before the positions become entrenched in 
mutual distrust. As one scholar recently noted:
[T]he debate about the universality or relativity of human rights is not only highly 
antagonistic, but it also takes place at an extremely abstract level ... . [A]t this 
metageneral level of analysis, almost all arguments become plausible, or equally true 
or false. One glosses over a multitude of cultural particularities such as those in Islam 
or traditional Africa, in a few pages, just for the sake of creating an argument about the 
presence or absence of human rights, an argument that can be contradicted the next
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moment with just as many convincing arguments... . When the debate on the 
universalism or relativism of human rights is so radically removed from the cultural 
“realities” it alleges to speak about, it hardly creates anything but its own impasse.122
Recent literature in the human rights area, which has explored areas such as the 
treatment of women’s rights as human rights, the status of indigenous peoples and 
other minority groups, and the special vulnerability of children and persons with 
disabilities, has led to a heightened awareness of the complexities involved in any 
attempt to define “human dignity”, and an acceptance of the need to contextualize such 
inquiries in order to see human beings in their multidimensionality. At the same time, 
there has been a marked reluctance to abandon the notion of universality without 
which, it is argued, no coherent conception of international human rights law can exist. 
Feminist analyses of international human rights law offer some important insights in 
this regard. Claims of cultural relativism have frequently been invoked to justify 
practices that are problematic from the perspective of gender equality. However, the 
response of women’s rights advocates to the challenge posed by cultural relativism has 
been complicated by the fact that feminist scholarship has had to critique universality, 
by arguing that the abstract conceptualization of human rights reflects only the 
“human” experience of males, while at the same time maintaining some ground for 
making a cross-cultural critique of practices that have a negative impact on women.123 
Many writers who have taken the view that women’s rights are universal have posited 
that the denial of those rights stems from oppressive systems that reflect male bias and 
are structured so as to marginalize and exclude women. Some writers have gone so far 
as to argue that a feminist approach to human rights can in fact sidestep the debate 
about relativism, because feminism offers a “multi-cultural response to the oppression 
of women.”124 Others have opted for an “instrumentalist” approach to universality, 
which simply views the concept as a useful strategic tool for achieving the protection 
of various rights.
However, despite its practical appeal such an approach is problematic. In an article 
entitled “Theorizing Women's Cultural Diversity in Feminist International Human 
Rights Strategies”, Annie Bunting notes, “[S]trategic implementation of universal 
rights suppresses and devalues cultural diversity. Fundamental cultural conflicts are 
left unresolved, buried beneath presumptively universal norms.”125 Bunting takes a 
considerably more nuanced approach to the challenge posed by cultural relativism.
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She emphasizes the dangers inherent in any attempt to understand either “female 
oppression” or “male domination” outside of specific cultural, historical, economic and 
political contexts. While recognizing that culture can construct and/or exacerbate 
gender inequality, Bunting refuses to posit a seemingly neutral or universal standpoint 
from which all cultures and societies can be judged, and which could lead to 
misleading oversimplification and generalization. She cautions against blanket 
condemnations of “patriarchy” and “male domination” that do little or nothing to 
account either for differences between cultures or for the particular kinds of oppression 
that women experience in their daily lives.
The concerns outlined above have provided an impetus to the development of 
approaches that attempt to overcome the stark dichotomy between universalism and 
relativism. Such an approach is reflected in the essays which make up a 1992 
collection edited by Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, Human Rights in Cross-Cultural 
Perspective: A Quest fo r  Consensus.126 An-Na'im roots his approach firmly in the 
practical imperative of understanding and bridging the gulf between the theory and 
practice of human rights. He articulates the challenge facing international human rights 
scholars: “Current and foreseeable new human rights cannot be seen as truly universal 
unless they are conceived and articulated within the widest possible range of cultural 
traditions.”127 At the same time, An-Na'im maintains a realistic view of the potential 
of this approach:
The proposed approach seeks to explore the possibilities of cultural reinterpretation and 
reconstruction through internal cultural discourse and cross-cultural dialogue, as a 
means to enhancing the universal legitimacy of human rights. This approach does not 
assume that sufficient cultural support for the full range of human rights is either already 
present or completely lacking in any given cultural tradition. Rather, more realistically, 
prevailing interpretations and perceptions of each cultural tradition can be expected to 
support some human rights while disagreeing with or even completely rejecting other 
human rights.128
The approach is particularly appealing because it avoids the antagonistic rhetoric 
that has characterized so much of the universality versus particularity debate. It 
attempts to find a middle ground within which human rights are seen as being defined 
by the interplay between international standards and particular cultural/societal values. 
In an essay in the same collection, Richard Falk criticizes the “all-or-nothing view of 
the relevance of culture” which has characterized many human rights scholars.129 He 
argues:
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[B]oth of these polar positions on the relevance of culture should be rejected. If the 
field of human rights continues to be controlled by these interpretive perspectives in 
their various forms, the most probable result is a demeaning encounter between two 
forms of fundamentalism, the pitting of relentless secularists against hardened 
traditionalists.130
Falk asserts that we need to recognize the reality o f cultural “penetration and 
overlapping”131 that characterizes the modem world. He urges us to recognize “an 
intermediating relevance for both international law and cultural hermeneutics, above 
all seeking to reconcile cultural and global sources of authority by reference to a core 
concern for the minimum decencies of individual and group existence.”132 The role of 
international human rights law, then, is to facilitate “dialogue about appropriate 
behavioral standards in an atmosphere of growing toleration for divergency arising 
from varying cultural traditions.”133
An-Na'im and Falk portray culture as a field of struggle, but seem to perceive it 
largely as an internal struggle. An-Na'im has pointed out the dangers involved in 
abandoning the religious or cultural domain to the tender mercies of fundamentalists 
who would like it to remain a bulwark against change.134 Writing specifically on the 
intersection of women’s rights and Islam, he makes important observations that are 
consistent with his overall approach to the intersection of international human rights 
norms and cultural or religious values. He points out that there is rarely, if ever, 
consensus within a given society about the implications of religious precepts. Culture 
and religion, far from being removed from the daily lives of men and women, 
constitute fora within which changing roles and values are debated. However, An- 
Na'im is careful to point out that the challenge of reinterpreting Islamic norms is one 
that is by definition limited to Muslims.135 International standards can play an 
important role in providing focal points for discussion, but they cannot simply be 
imposed without sensitivity to cultural and historical specificity.
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On the other hand, there has recently been increased attention paid to the ways in 
which notions of human rights have in fact begun to interact and perhaps even merge 
with cultural understandings. For example, a recent collection entitled Human Rights, 
Culture and Context: Anthropological Perspectives136 offers illuminating examples of 
the ways in which human rights discourse is deployed in local contexts, with a view 
to examining the “globalisation of human rights”.137 In his introduction to the volume, 
Richard Wilson notes that universalism and relativism each offer some conceptual 
advantages, but that “the universalist/relativist polarity is too totalising in its 
conceptualisation.”138 A more fruitful way of examining the problems posed by the 
debate, according to Wilson, is to engage in “more detailed studies of human rights 
according to the actions and intentions of social actors within wider historical 
constraints of institutionalised power.”139 He criticizes the traditional cultural relativist 
approach for invoking a “misguided conception of culture”, one that constructs culture 
as “internally uniform and hermetically bounded”:140
‘Culture’ is seen as shared and normative, not as cross-cut by social differences (age, 
caste, gender, etc.), or characterised as contested, fragmented, contextualised and 
emergent. Culture is referred to as an entity, not as a process; as a noun, not a verb. For 
their doctrine to be coherent, cultural relativists seem to hold a nineteenth-century 
notion of culture as discrete and homogeneous, as the product of isolation, and as the 
basis of all difference and similarity between human beings. Their relativism is 
predicated upon bounded conceptions of linguistic and cultural systems, but it fells apart 
in contexts of hybridity, créolisation, intermixture and the overlapping of political 
traditions.141
Perhaps even more importantly, however, relativists have ignored the extent to which 
human rights have filtered into this “cultural” realm: “Despite the charges of some 
governments of ‘cultural imperialism’ in the application of international law, human 
rights doctrine has been adopted by many people to whom it was once foreign.”142
Wilson does not deny the dangers of ethnocentrism in the human rights context, 
but sees the universalist position as having increasing validity, and the relativist 
position as being increasingly undermined, through “the globalisation of cultural,
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economic and political processes.”143 Indeed, Wilson suggests we may be moving into 
a ‘post-cultural’ world.144 He is careful to qualify what he means by globalisation:
[G]lobalisation does not mean the same as westernisation, modernisation or 
standardisation ... . [W]e should not adopt a diffusionist view of globalisation since it 
does not just imply a process of homogénisation and integration, but involves a 
proliferation of diversity as well. A diversity of normative orders may still prevail, and 
may even be exacerbated by global processes, but they are no longer predicated upon 
isolation. Rather, a sense of different is constructed out of relatedness, opposition and 
an awareness of plurality. Nor are moral differences as reliant on enclosed systems as 
before, but are more fragmented and susceptible to transnational flows of moral values, 
particularly through world religions. Just because a cultural form is global, it does not 
mean that everyone relates to it in the same way — its interpretation depends on local and 
individual value distinctions.145
To speak of the universality of human rights, then, “becomes a question of context, 
necessitating a situational analysis.”146 Anticipating criticism that such a requirement 
drifts back into relativism, Wilson insists, “It is possible to have contextualisation 
without relativisation, since one can keep open the possibility, and in the dying embers 
of the twentieth century, the likelihood, that contexts are interlinked through a variety 
of processes”.147 Moreover, he emphasizes, the attention to context requires far more 
than attention to cultural boundaries -  specificity extends to a wide variety of factors:
Local interpretations of human rights doctrine draw on personal biographies, community 
histories, and on expressions of power relations between interest groups. Their 
relationship to formal, legal versions has to be discovered, not assumed. Just because 
an Asian or African human rights organisation uses the language of human rights, 
against its government, it should not be assumed that human rights are being invoked 
in an orthodox and positivist legal manner. This assumption ignores the degree to which 
human rights doctrine does get reworked and transformed in different contexts, whether 
the context is “non-Westem” or not.148
Despite their differences, the approaches discussed in this section go beyond a 
static view of either culture or international human rights norms. The development of 
those norms is seen as an inherently dynamic process; the standards embodied in the 
Universal Declaration and other human rights instruments are constantly being 
recreated. Thus, rather than constituting two irreconcilable positions, universality and 
particularity are seen as poles between which our thinking about human rights must
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constantly oscillate in order to capture the complexity and diversity of human 
experience.
Implications for the Universal Declaration
What are the implications of these debates for the “universal” status of the Universal 
Declaration? One might choose to regard them as indicative of the contingent, 
tentative and ultimately ungrounded nature of the document. For those who regard the 
Declaration itself as a kind of “foundation”, a bedrock for international human rights 
law as a whole, such an approach offers little appeal: fluidity and dynamism may have 
their advantages, but surely leave something to be desired when it comes to an area of 
such fundamental importance. On the other hand, there is the choice of immunizing 
the Declaration from the contagion of theory by elevating its significance to mythic 
proportions, thus placing it beyond questioning and critique. Arguably, however, to 
do so is to lose sight of the Declaration itself, and to raise an idol in its place. Few 
scholars or activists would openly espouse such an alternative, but it is worth 
questioning the extent to which their unwillingness to engage with serious theoretical 
critiques amounts to much the same stance.
Perhaps one author captures it best when he notes:
The 1948 Universal Declaration was a historic document. It is rightly regarded as a key 
moment in shaping the post-war world. In the meantime, however, it has become also 
a historical document. It can now be seen to mirror the concerns of that time and to 
embody its asymmetry of political power.149
Historic and historical: this implies that the importance of the Universal Declaration 
as a landmark in the development of international human rights law should be 
celebrated but, at the same time, its context, specificity and limitations must also be 
acknowledged. This does not mean that we must discard the Universal Declaration 
and start all over again. The Declaration remains relevant and important, a testimony 
to a particular ethos at a particular historical juncture, but cannot be assumed to 
represent an eternal and exhaustive enumeration of the common aspirations of the 
international community.
For far too long, challenges to universality have been interpreted as rejections of 
human rights, cynical and self-interested invocations of ill-founded philosophical, 
cultural or political values. Perhaps one might instead welcome those challenges as 
presenting another historic opportunity: the opportunity to open up human rights 
discourse to those whose aspirations it has always been intended to embody, to 
incorporate and reflect the tremendous diversity within the international community.
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What better way, after all, to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration?
